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ABSTRACT

STUNTED GROWTH: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY‘S MATURATION

By
Dana Fronczak
May 2013

Thesis supervised by Dr. Lewis Irwin
Scholars have proposed numerous explanations as to why the Department of
Homeland Security has struggled to mature as an organization and effectively conduct its
core mission. We propose an alternative viewpoint that the department lacks key legal
authorities and necessitates key organizational transfer in order to rationalize its portfolio.
We examine these points through review of legal authorities in select mission areas and
through a resource analysis of activities conducted throughout the federal government to
execute the homeland security mission. The analysis leads to specific recommendations
for transfers and authorities and suggestions as to how the political environment might
coalesce around engendering these changes.
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I.

Introduction

Drug Interdiction. Infrastructure Assessments. Commodities Stockpiling. Disaster
Response Search and Rescure. Currency Investigations. Passenger Screening. Cyber
Security. Immigrant Processing.Virus Detection. Communications Interoperability.
Border Checkpoints.
What do these seemingly incoherent functions have to do with one another? They
are all responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the enormous
government agency created in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the course
of one day, DHS screens over 2 million people at over 300 international and domestic
airports; it will also screen 71,000 cargo containers at sea and land ports; it will
apprehend 1,983 people who cross the border illegally and accept more than 3,200 who
become legal citizens1. It will analyze and try to prevent cyber attacks, prepare for
emerging natural hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes and protect the President,
Vice-President and any visiting heads of state from harm2.
Melded from 22 federal agencies and 170,000 employees, DHS assumed
responsibility for an enormous number of diverse and complex missions, a portfolio that
requires a widely dispersed focus. The department further expanded its missions and
functions in its first seven years due to mandates from Congress and the Office of the
President. The Department now comprises over a dozen different components and over
216,000 employees3.
In addition to its own resources, DHS requires the cooperation of an enormous
number of other federal agencies, state and local governments and private-sector partners.
All of this must happen in order to get the ―homeland security‖ mission right‘
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consequently, at times there are overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles within that
panoply of groups.
But that‘s not all DHS does.
Collecting tariff revenue. Protecting against exploited children. Polar icebreaking.
Training other federal agents. Environmental cleanups. Recreational boating safety.
Preventing international piracy. Another set of missions that belong to DHS, in some
capacity, but ones that don‘t fit easily with protecting the United States from a terrorist
attack and responding when a catastrophic event occurs. These also require coordination,
money and effort. In many cases DHS is required by law to carry them out. In fact, when
the Department was created, it was specifically charged to maintain the functions of the
agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing
the homeland4.
All of the DHS missions, whether core ―homeland security‖ missions or not, are
completed under the glare of public, political and media scrutiny. These missions are also
completed under the sometimes conflicting principles of preserving freedom and
facilitating the free flow of commerce while ensuring safety and security.
The department has suffered nearly constant criticism for its handling of many
key events, most notably its response after the city of New Orleans‘s levee system failed
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which was seen as a manifestation of the Department‘s
failure to take its disaster preparedness, response and recovery mission seriously 5 6. But
other issues, including its struggles to secure the United States‘ borders, effective
screening of airport passengers, apprehending and removing illegal immigrants, and
disseminating grants to state and local entities to prepare for a terrorist attack have also
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come under controversy. In part because of these problems, the department has both
instituted and been subjected to numerous reorganizations in its short history7.
As DHS approaches its tenth anniversary, many of these inherent challenges
persist. Various reasons are touted for why DHS has failed to mature and coalesce into a
single unified coordinator for homeland security activities. One of the reasons cited is the
department‘s inability to effectively manage its own resources, resulting in the
department‘s inclusion on the Government Accountability Office‘s biennial ―High-Risk‖
list since the department was created 8 9 10 11. Another reason cited is the department‘s
lack of progress in integrating its legacy organizational cultures, resulting in a collection
of agencies rather than an integrated department. 12 Yet another possible cause identified
is the widely dispersed oversight by over 100 Congressional committees, which forces
the department to spend an inordinate amount of resources compared to other agencies
preparing and responding to Congressional inquiry13 14.
These points (Congressional oversight, internal barriers, lack of DHS managerial
acumen) have been cited in legislative and policy circles as reasons for the department‘s
failures, but there potentially lies a more fundamental capability in order to truly carry
out its mission. The crucial decisions about what organizations would comprise the
department and what authorities the department would be given were made in the nascent
days of its creation, and have largely not been revisited since the DHS was created in
2003.
The thesis of this paper is that the department lacks key legal authorities and
requires key organizational transfers, both to add and remove functions, that would create
a more robust and comprehensive homeland security capability. In order for the
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department to truly reach maturity, it must engage in another ―rationalizing‖ set of
activities, one that examines both legal and organizational barriers to success.

Figure 1 – Original Composition of DHS, January 2003
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II. Paper Structure
DHS was created in order to coordinate the disparate efforts of the ―homeland
security enterprise,‖ the various stakeholders that contribute to the collective security of
the United States15. As an organization, DHS still lacks the necessary authorities to
coordinate the various homeland security functions strewn throughout the federal
government, the states, cities and the private sector. In addition, the department‘s own
organizations lack key capabilities that are essential to fulfilling the five missions
articulated in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 16, modeled after the
Department of Defense‘s quadrennial review commenced after the Cold War 17. In turn,
the legislation that codified the DHS retained responsibility for numerous functions that
have no homeland security nexus. The theory proposed is that the department can only
evolve so far unless these fundamental issues are addressed. In essence, the department‘s
ability to thrive is ―stunted‖ by these institutional hindrances.
In order to better understand the challenges that DHS faces defining its role, a
short history lesson is beneficial in order to examine the decision-making process that led
to agencies and authorities‘ inclusion and exclusion. Examining the department‘s
evolution from a White House Office of Homeland Security into a full federal department
illustrates the decisions made within the context of the political and policymaking
environment that now hinder the department‘s coordination of homeland security threats
and allowed for the inheritance of many non-homeland security functions. This will also
be conducted using some theoretical constructs about how the bureaucracy is developed,
molded and altered.
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The next step is to examine the Department‘s core missions as recently defined by
its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and examine specifically what authorities
(and correspondingly, what authorities it lacks) it holds to conduct those missions. As
mentioned previously, homeland security involves an enormous level of effort from state
and local governments, the private sector and non-governmental organizations18 In many
cases, DHS must persuade or negotiate with those organizations to comply with its
standards or recommendations, rather than possessing the power of regulatory authority
or legislation to compel them.
Next, we will look at the department‘s current organizational structure, and
contrast it with the dollars and organizations used for homeland security purposes. This
can be done utilizing the Office of Management and Budget‘s Organizing the Budget for
Homeland Security, published as part of the annual budget. For the budget year 2010, a
total of $70 billion dollars was appropriated for homeland security activities across 32
agencies as diverse as the Department of Commerce and the Social Security
Administration19. These appropriations will be examined in depth to review what
homeland security functions reside within the department and what functions reside
outside in other federal agencies. Lastly, based on these analyses, recommendations shall
be offered in order to bolster the department‘s organizational structure and authorities.
These recommendations shall include both additions and potential subtractions to the
department in order to more properly align resources with their most appropriate
organization, as well as potential changes in legal authorities.
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It is acknowledged up front that these changes are fraught with political
difficulties, and they cannot happen overnight. With that caveat in mind, included are
specific thoughts for how some of these changes might be implemented.

II.

Homeland Polity: DHS’s Formulation

President George W. Bush announced the creation of a White House Office of
Homeland Security 11 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon20. Bush appointed Tom Ridge, then the Governor of Pennsylvania, as its
Director. ―Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local
governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be
coordinated at the highest level,‖ Bush said. 21 However, this simple declaration for the
unified coordination of 40 different agencies with Homeland Security responsibilities
belied the internal struggles, presidential recalcitrance and eventual dramatic turnaround
that culminated with the creation of a Cabinet-level department in January, 2003.
An effort to establish a National Homeland Security Agency was first introduced
before the 9/11 attacks by Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX)22. The agency Thornberry
envisioned would have reported to the National Security Council and not been
established as a Cabinet-level agency. Thornberry‘s also envisioned a significantly
smaller organizational merger than the agency that was eventually founded in 2003. His
bill only included the United States Coast Guard 9(then a part of the United States
Department of Transportation, the Border Patrol (a part of the United States Treasury),
the U.S. Customs Service (also a part of the Treasury), the Federal Emergency
7

Management Agency and several infrastructure security offices located in the Department
of Commerce and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The National Homeland Security Agency‘s makeup was borne out of a report
from a panel known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, which transmitted its findings to
Congress in February of 2001. The work of the Commission originated in 1998 in
response to the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the 1995 bombing
of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. In its research, the
Commission concluded that over 40 entities contributed to homeland security at that time
and that, first and foremost, the disparate functions required a ―culture of coordinated
strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. 23 While the
Commission did propose several structural changes in the national security bureaucracy,
including the ones that Thornberry adopted in his bill, it left much of the apparatus alone.
The White House initially took a more conservative approach. Vice-President
Dick Cheney, in response to the Commission‘s report, established a ―National
Preparedness Review‖ that focused on a terrorist attack utilizing a weapon of mass
destruction. 24 The review did not begin until a few days before the 9/11 attacks occurred,
and was quickly superseded by the White House‘s establishment of an Office of
Homeland Security in October of 2001.25 The office intended to develop a national
strategy for homeland security but did not intend to move any agencies out of their
existing organizational structures.26 After the attacks, Bush appointed Tom Ridge, the
governor of Pennsylvania, to the position of homeland security advisor and the head of
the newly created office within the Executive Office of the President.
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Almost concurrently, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT, but then a Democrat)
introduced a bill In October 2001 to create a Cabinet-level agency that included a set of
organizations comparable to Thornberry‘s. Lieberman‘s bill was met with skepticism by
the White House27; Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer stated that ―Creating a cabinet post
doesn‘t solve the problem‖ 28, and the White House continued to oppose the creation of a
new department for several months after the 9/11 attacks.29
While Lieberman‘s bill sought to establish a Cabinet-level agency, Senator Bob
Graham (D-Florida) introduced a bill to transfer the White House office of Homeland
Security into a National Office for Combating Terrorism. 30 Graham‘s recommendation
was based upon a study developed by the Gilmore Commission, chaired by former
Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore. The Gilmore Commission produced five reports on
an annual basis from 1999 until 2003. The commission recommended a White House
Office with a coordinator that would be appointed by the Senate.
Despite the differences in the proposals, over the next several months a coalition
formed in the Legislature to create a new Cabinet-level agency. Calculating that it would
lose a battle with Congress over the creation of a new department, 31 the administration
shifted gears and began to quietly formulate a proposal of its own to create a Cabinetlevel Homeland Security agency. 32
The department was formed by a small set of actors within the Bush
administration.33 One of the legislative requests the Bush White House made involved
reasserting its ability to reorganize. Initially developed via a 1934 statute and altered via a
Supreme Court decision involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
authority had expired in 1984.34
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In summary level, President Bush‘s vision of a new department incorporated a
series of directorates that organized the 22 agencies into a series of Directorates:
Management, Science and Technology, Border and Transportation Security, Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness and Response, each
run by an Under Secretary. However, several organizations and offices would also report
directly to the Secretary, including the United States Coast Guard and the United States
Secret Service, which each retained status as a ―distinct entity‖ within the organizational
structure35.
Bush introduced his plan for a Department of Homeland Security on June 18,
2002, and subsequently released his National Strategy for Homeland Security one month
later.36 Bush‘s proposal was sponsored by Rep. Dick Armey (R-Tex) and introduced to
the House of Representatives on June 24, 200237. The bill was quickly approved by the
house and approved by the Senate in November, 2002. President Bush signed it into law
on November, 25, 2002.
This history provides the factual elements of the department‘s formulation. In examining
the history, a few observations emerge. First, the impetus to change homeland defense
was undertaken at first via a slow bureaucratic process that was then dramatically
interrupted by the introduction of a crisis. Second, once that crisis occurred, many
competing interests, both individual and institutional, desired to change the structure of
homeland security, with each individual or institution attempting to suit the bureaucratic
realignment to their interests and authorities. This notion of ―turf‖ was tantamount, and it
manifested itself in a secretive and exclusionary alignment process that was essentially
conducted by five individuals within the White House 38 Led by White House Chief of
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Staff Andrew Card, those included Vice-president Richard Cheney, Ridge, national
security adviser Condoleezza Rice, director of the office of Management and Budget
Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. and Cheney Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby. 39
Within that process, many organizations were deemed politically infeasible for
transfer, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Guard 40. Third,
once the crisis occurred, the proceedings to create what was the largest government
reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947 happened in dramatically quick
fashion when compared to the usual pace of government change.
The next section provides a literature review of the theoretical foundations of
bureaucratic change and applies those foundations to the specific mechanics of the
formulation of DHS.

III.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Only nine years old, analyses of DHS are somewhat limited, and have decreased
in the last few years as attention has been pulled away in security think-tanks from
homeland security back towards international security issues such as Afghanistan and the
emergence of China as strategic adversary. Government think-tanks and oversight reports
from entities such as the Government Accountability Office provide some perspective on
the department‘s challenges, but primarily focus on the department‘s internal issues 41 42.
However, Congressional dispersal of legislative authority in the context of newly created
agencies and the reorganization of the government as a response to a policy crisis in not
unusual; useful lessons can be gleaned from other government reorganizations and, more
11

generally, the perspectives of scholars who have studied policy formulation in the federal
government.
Typically in the American bureaucracy, the formulation of government agencies
has occurred for four different reasons: some were foundational agencies that constituted
essential government functions (the Departments of State and Treasury); some were
created in response to needs of growth (the Departments of Justice and Interior); others
were created because of specific ―clientele‖ (the Departments of Agriculture and Labor
for farmers and industrial laborers, respectively); still others were created in response to
specific national priorities (the Departments of Health and Human Services and Housing
and Urban Development)43 44.
DHS was created in response to a national crisis rather than any one of the
aforementioned reasons, specifically a terrorist attack. The notion of terrorism was
certainly not new to the United States; the first real operational definition of terrorism in
United States law was established in 1996; it established terrorism as ―intimidation or
coercion or to retaliate against government conduct‖45. Terrorist attacks involving
American citizen victims had previously been enacted a number of times, including
foreign actors in international arenas (airplane hijackings and embassy bombings such as
the near-simultaneous attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-EsSalaam, Tanzania in 1998), foreign actors in domestic arenas (the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing) or domestic actors in domestic arenas (the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, in 1995 by militia member Timothy McVeigh).
More specifically, Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Osama Bin Laden,
had been identified in the mid-1980‘s as a nascent threat, even before the end of the Cold
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War46. The recognition of Al Qaeda as a global threat, among other, initiated the series of
commissions and reports described in the previous section.
None of these events or revelations, however, led to the widespread call for a
reorganization of the government. Clearly the attacks on the World Trade Center,
Pentagon, and the failed attack by a fourth plane that crash-landed in Shanksville, PA did
promulgate that call. An event such as the 9/11 attacks is referred to a ―policy
disruption,‖ a moment in time where a significant event presents a challenge and an
opportunity to recalibrate the approach to a particular issue 47. Scholars also refer to this
type of disruption as a ―punctuated equilibrium‖ theory of policymaking, where a
pressing issue results in a period of instability. During these unstable windows, new
institutional structures emerge that often remain in place for long periods of time 48. The
smaller events that preceded 9/11, however, were not sufficiently disruptive to puncture
the existing homeland defense/ homeland security structure and promulgate legislative
change49
Some of the more recent government agency formations have been instituted in
order to provide a coordinating function after a period of instability occurred, though
none was created with nearly as drastic a punctuated equilibrium as 9/11. The
Department of Energy was formulated in 1977 as both a coordinating function as well as
a response to a policy disruption, that being an energy crisis that produced an economic
recession. The Energy department evolved from a White House Federal Energy office to
a Federal Energy Administration and, finally, to a Cabinet-level agency. 50
This period of instability can also be referred to as a ―policy window;‖ policy
windows emerge when a problem is identified, solutions are available, and institutional
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inertia is surmountable. 51 In situations where the policy window is created by a crisis,
typically the policy window has a short lifespan52 53. The attacks of 9/11 proved the
exception, not the rule, due to the seminal nature of the event and more importantly, the
huge opportunity for potential change in authorities and structures that 9/11 afforded. As
the history shows, despite Kingdon‘s and Downs‘ assertions that policy windows borne
of crises happen in a short period, it took well over 18 months from 9/11 to a newly
formed DHS, yet it was created.
During ―policy windows,‖ the differing federal branches (executive, legislative)
each attempt to reformulate the existing structure(s) in such a way as to increase their
sphere of control. Wise asserts that there are three distinct ways that this occurs:
executive order coordination, a statutory coordinator and full Congressional control. 54
Through executive order coordination, presidential leadership tends to try and
centralize command and control of the institutions responsible for tackling the disruption.
This is most often executed via the use of policy czars and other coordinating bodies. 55 56.
This was President Bush‘s first approach when he established a White House office of
Homeland Security with Gov. Ridge as its head. A vital necessity for executive order
coordination is executive activism; the White House must be willing to vigilantly provide
policy direction, enforce that direction via the threat of reducing resources and mitigate
disputes between bureaucratic entities; otherwise, fragmentation will occur 57.
As previously discussed, the Gilmore commission had previously advocated for
something in between a White House declared office and a full-fledged Cabinet agency.
In this framework, referred to as a ―statutory coordinator,‖ Congress establishes by law a
coordinating body within the White House, but because it is established by statute,
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Congress retains significant oversight authority58 Congress‘ motivation was one of
control; if Homeland Security were housed within the White House, Congress would lack
the ability to confirm a Departmental head via the Senate and experience a decreased
ability to influence policymaking via the committee process.
The third option, Congressional control, would manifest itself in the creation of an
entirely new agency where both the creation and continuation of programs (authorization)
and the funding of programs (appropriation) would be controlled by the legislature. In
this scenario, House and Senate committees retained their oversight over the individual
functions of the proposed department.
This scenario, of course, eventually won the day. The obvious question is: why
did it win? One definite reason was that the President recognized politically that
Congress held the votes to establish a Cabinet-level agency and therefore relented.
However, the more structural reason is that a policy window had opened; a
problem had been identified (terrorism on American soil) solutions were available (the
concept of a DHS or something like it had already been circulated), and institutional
inertia was surmountable. Government‘s tendency to offer a previously formulated
solution with existing support to address a current problem 59 meant that the concept of a
DHS, even though it was the President‘s, was quickly moved for approval by the
Congress. Also, the uniquely traumatic occurrence of multiple attacks on American soil
meant that by seizing the initiation of a DHS, the executive branch, while ceding the
concept of Congressional control, could more effectively control the elements and the
legislative edicts that comprised the new department.
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The government now had a huge reorganization on its hands, a situation in which
success depended on numerous factors, including degrees of organizational attention and
the ways different players perceive the problems and opportunities 60. The force with
which a new bureaucratic institution alters or influences the existing system plays a major
role in how effective the response is to a policy disruption. That force, however, is
challenged by existing system dynamics. When those dynamics are disrupted by new
problems or institutions, the tendency is for institutions to act resilient and resistant to
significant changes61 62. Existing organizations already possessed homeland security
capabilities and, as the history shows, loathed to give that capability away to a new entity.
The merger of the Armed Forces offers a case study. After the end of the Second
World War, the War Department submitted a plan to organize the Armed Forces under a
single coordinating structure. The Army and the Navy voiced support and resistance,
respectively, based upon the impacts a reorganization would have on their autonomy. 63
Autonomy is the notion that an organization enjoys relatively well-defined domains and
can execute its mission in a space that allows an organization to develop effectively64.
Within a government organization, high effectiveness tends to occur when agencies hold
goals that are popular, engage in simple tasks, don‘t have a lot of bureaucratic rivals and
possess minimal constraints. More informally, this is called ―turf.‖ Normally a pejorative
term, ―turf‖ can also be viewed as an appropriate assertion of authority over a subject
matter to which an entity holds responsibility.
The Army believed that a unified command structure would benefit its autonomy
because it feared that the emergence of nuclear deterrence as a military strategy would
lessen the need for ground troops and infantry support, obviously its bellwethers. In turn,
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the Navy opposed a unified command because its organizational structure provided it
both an independent force of ground troops (The Marines) and, more importantly, its own
air unit (naval aviation). Reorganization and the presumed examination of resource
alignments would put the Navy‘s autonomy at risk, it believed.
Eventually a structure was formed that largely satisfied everyone‘s desires to
maintain autonomy; it created a formally unified defense department structure but
provided little authority to the Secretary of Defense; in fact, the bureaucracy increased
via the introduction of a Department of the Air Force65.What didn‘t happen was any type
of systematic recalibration of resources based on the delineation of missions.
To synopsize these different theoretical lenses in the context of the formation of
the Homeland Security department brings us to the following summary: the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 represented a ―punctuated equilibrium,‖ or ―policy disruption.‖ This led to
a ―policy window,‖ which was initially met with an organization (the White House office
of Homeland Security) created under the tenet of ―White House control.‖ However, that
‗policy window‖ remained open enough, due to the magnanimity of the event, that
―Congressional Control,‖ via the creation of a Cabinet-level agency, became the eventual
reality. The White House, however, in a bit of political gamesmanship, introduced its
own Homeland Security department prior to the passage of any legislation, and this
concept became the choice of all parties, with its previously discussed inclusions and
exclusions. This choice has led to consequences in the execution of the homeland security
mission, intended or unintended. DHS lacks ―turf,‖ the hypothesis of this paper asserts
based on the definition provided above. It cannot assert authority because it both lacks
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the legislative mandates to do so and because it lacks control over many of the
organizational assets needed to most effectively conduct its mission.
The next section of this paper will examine the results of this organizational
transformation through two lenses; first, a series of key functional areas will be analyzed
in terms of the current authorities granted to DHS and the agency‘s effectiveness within
those functional areas. Second, we will examine federal expenditures of homeland
security as a whole, to determine where the resources are allocated for the function across
the federal government, and what that means for the effectiveness of the mission.

V. Authorities and Bureaucracies

DHS emerged via the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and was touted as the
answer to America‘s need to prevent future terrorist attacks inside the United States. But
as previously indicated, a number of choices were instituted in its formulation and early
history that have impacted its ability to execute its Congressionally stated missions.
In examining the authorities granted to the DHS, an examination of the
department‘s current missions, goals and objectives provides a useful lens. Congress
chartered DHS to specifically prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America‘s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the impact and recover from attacks
that do occur66. However, the department inherited a host of agencies whose missions
comprise broader edicts than simply preventing, protecting and responding to terrorist
attacks. As part of a belated effort that was mandated in the Homeland Security Act, DHS
completed its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) in 2009. The
18

prevention of terrorism was but one element of securing the homeland defined in the
QHSR; securing America‘s borders, enforcing immigration laws, responding to and
recovering from natural, technological or hostile disasters and securing cyberspace have
all emerged as distinct missions. The Department also compartmentalized the other
functions that it inherited as part of the reorganization that created DHS into a sixth
functional area. 67

Table/Chart 1 – Missions and Goals of the Department of Homeland Security
identified during the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
• Goal 1.1: Prevent Terrorist Attacks
• Goal 1.2: Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials and Capabilities
• Goal 1.3: Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key Leadership, and
Events

Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders

• Goal 2.1: Effectively Control U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders
• Goal 2.2: Safeguard Lawful Trade and Travel
• Goal 2.3: Disrupt and Dismantle Transnational Criminal
Organizations
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws

• Goal 3.1: Strengthen and Effectively Administer the Immigration
System
• Goal 3.2: Prevent Unlawful Immigration
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace

19

• Goal 4.1: Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment
• Goal 4.2: Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

• Goal 5.1: Mitigate Hazards
• Goal 5.2: Enhance Preparedness
• Goal 5.3: Ensure Effective Emergency Response
• Goal 5.4: Rapidly Recover

Source: Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

Table/Chart 2 – Additional Goals
Functional Area 6: Providing Essential Support to National and
Economic Security
• Goal 6.1: Collect Customs Revenue and Enforce Import/Export
Controls
• Goal 6.2: Ensure Maritime Safety and Environmental Stewardship
• Goal 6.3: Conduct and Support Other Law Enforcement Activities
• Goal 6.4: Provide Specialized National Defense Capabilities

Source: Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

Using this mission structure, we can examine a number of specific areas and
examine whether the requisite authorities exist to effectively execute its stated goals.

Intelligence
In examining the mission structure at the objective level, we find that the very
first objective of the department is to Understand the Threat, under the mission of
20

Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security. ―Understand‖ in this context primarily
relates to intelligence gathering and dissemination. Intelligence forms the basis of two
other objectives within the mission structure, within Goals 1.2 (Prevent the Unauthorized
Acquisition or Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials) and
Goal 4.1 (Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment) 68
When the department was created, it initially formed a Directorate for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). The Information Analysis arm of that
organization was pulled out and made into its own Office of Intelligence and Analysis in
2005 as part of the Department‘s Second Stage Review,69 in an attempt to centralize the
coordination and dissemination of intelligence products to state and local law
enforcement. However, an examination of the authorities in the Homeland Security Act
reveals inherent limitations
The Homeland Security Act specifically calls for the Information Analysis
portion of the Directorate to ―access, receive and analyze law enforcement information,
intelligence information and other information from Agencies of the Federal
Government,‖ then aggregate and analyze these pieces of data for state and local issues 70.
At approximately the same time, a report released by a joint Congressional committee
recommended that DHS establish an ―all-source terrorism fusion center‖ that would
amalgamate ―raw‖ data, analyze it, package it, and disseminate it to state and local
entities71. The law makes no mention of the department establishing its own intelligence
gathering capability; instead, it renders the DHS specifically reliant on other agencies to
furnish intelligence that it then can analyze and disseminate to state and local authorities.
The Department primarily relies on open source data, and typically does not engage in
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the more widely recognized actions related to international intelligence gathering, such as
signals and imagery intelligence 72.
In addition to furnishing no organic intelligence capability within the DHS, the
legislation also offers vague protocols for DHS obtaining ―raw‖ information. On one
hand, the Homeland Security Act indicates that the Secretary of DHS must specifically
request information from other agencies, while a subsequent passage indicates that other
agencies, despite a lack of a specific request, ―shall promptly provide to the Secretary‖ all
materials related to threats against the United States.
Furthermore, because no explicit authorities were established granting the
department a central role in either the development of domestic intelligence or in the
coordination and integration of existing agencies‘ domestic intelligence, other agencies
filled the department‘s power vacuum. After 9/11, the FBI reacted swiftly to change its
primary focus from law enforcement to counterterrorism 73. At the same time Congress
deliberated the formation of DHS, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Robert Mueller, announced the creation of a Directorate of Intelligence as part of a
significant reorganization to emphasize counterterrorism. 74 This Office of Intelligence
would be created in order to assist in ―pulling together bits and pieces of information that
often comes from separate sources;‖ the Department of Justice dedicated millions of
dollars to hiring and training more intelligence analysts 75.
The FBI, in fact, has acknowledged that since 9/11, it has shifted many of its
resources and focus from law enforcement to terrorism, increasing its prosecutions for
terrorism and national security cases by over 800 percent. 76
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There is no single domestic intelligence agency in the United States; unlike
foreign intelligence, which relies on a few key players (the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency), domestic intelligence initiates at a variety of differing
levels. Federal law enforcement agencies (most predominantly the FBI), as well as state
and local law enforcement play key roles, as well as the owner/operators of private sector
critical infrastructure. This coterie of law enforcement organizations and critical
infrastructure owner/operators numbers in the thousands. 77 Therefore, much of the ability
of the Department of Homeland Security to identify threats to the homeland depends on
the intelligence-gathering and disseminating capabilities of other agencies, though the
Office of I&A office does gather some intelligence from DHS operational components
such as the Coast Guard, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and US Customs
and Border Protection.78
The department has attempted to integrate the intelligence and operational aspects
of homeland security through a concept known as fusion centers. The stated goal of
fusion centers is to ‗blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis
and Coordinate security measures to reduce threats in their communities79. Fusion centers
began as an attempt to link federal, state and local resources in one environment in order
to expand the traditional subjects of state and local intelligence (domestic and
transnational crime including drugs, prostitution, and other organized criminal activity)
and into acts of terrorism.
However, fusion centers have struggled to obtain federal resources from the
interagency, despite support from DHS in the form of grants to the states (ibid), although
information sharing appears to be trending in the right direction 80. The I&A office still

23

lacks a permanent presence in many fusion centers, unlike the Department of Justice,
which has located staff at all fusion centers since 200781; in addition, DHS operational
components often neglect to share information with the fusion centers, instead relying on
local relationships established outside of this formal information sharing construct82.
Even though the recommendations from the House Joint Committee on
Intelligence recommended establishing an intelligence coordination center within the
newly created department, President Bush instead chose to build a Terrorist Threat
Integration Center within the Central Intelligence Agency in 2003 83. A year later,
primary coordination for domestic terrorism issues fell to the National Counterterrorism
Center under the control of the Director for National Intelligence, which was created as
an attempt to coordinate the efforts of all 16 agencies with intelligence capabilities, now
known as the ―Intelligence Community‖ 84 85. Although Intelligence and Analysis is a
member of the intelligence community, DHS, again, must obtain information from other,
more well-developed intelligence capabilities as opposed to generating its own86.
The ability of the department to act on information is hindered by its ability to
quickly gather that information for its progenitors. This challenge was clearly
demonstrated in the bombing attempt on Christmas Day, 2009. Umar Farouk
Abdulmattalab, a Nigerian national, boarded a plane in Yemen bound for Detroit. As the
plane approached the Detroit airport, Abdulmattalab attempted to light a homemade
incendiary device onboard the plane. His plan was thwarted by alert passengers.
An initial investigation by the White House revealed that the intelligence
gathering had identified four differing streams of data – one from a United Nations
advisor, one from the National Security Agency within the Department of Defense, one
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within the NCTC within the Department of Justice and a fourth from the United States
Embassy in Nigeria87. The fourth stream was the more commonly known attempt by
Abdulmattalab‘s father to inform the embassy that his son was missing and ―was likely
under the influence of religious extremists based in Yemen.‖ 88
What appeared to work, at least in the initial analysis, was the sharing of
information among the collectors. As was mentioned previously, there were a number of
different threads of information related to Abdulmatallab from different sources. But
what appeared to fail in this context was knowledge transfer from information collectors
to actors; in this case, DHS organizations as United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, which might have checked Abdulmattalab‘s name against a terrorist
database and recommended to the State Department that Abdulmatallab‘s visa be denied,
or US Customs and Border Protection, which through its Immigration Advisory Program,
can make a recommendation to foreign authorities whether or not an individual should be
allowed to board an aircraft bound for the United States. In this case, because
Abdulmatallab‘s name did not appear on either the Terrorist Screening Database or the
more restrictive No-Fly List, no recommendation was made to Dutch officials 89. There
appeared to be more of a focus on the potential of an attack on US interests in Yemen
than on a direct attack on the United States90. Part of the lack of focus on securing the
homeland still appears to be a cultural divide and an operational gap between the
collectors of intelligence, who are primarily oriented in the international sphere, and the
DHS operators, obviously focused on the domestic sphere91 92.
This captures only part of the problem. Because DHS lacks an inherent
intelligence collection capability or an authoritative operational command to take in and
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disseminate information, but instead relies on others who rarely orient their thinking
towards a domestic threat, it remains stifled in its ability to rapidly deploy
countermeasures that would have potentially interdicted a terrorist actor such as
Abdulmatallab before he ever boarded a plane.
Another case of the failure to adequately share information occurred in the case of
Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army major serving as a psychiatrist. Hassan, of Palestinian
descent, killed and wounded 42 persons on the campus of Ft. Hood, Texas. Although
there are lingering debates about whether Hassan‘s attack was a manifestation or radical
Islamic extremism or a case of radical workplace violence, there is no doubt that Hassan
communicated with and proselytized about radical Islamic thinking. Hassan delivered a
guest lecture in 2007 entitled, ―Is the War on Terrorism a War on Islam? an Islamic
Perspective,‖ where he appeared to be justifying terrorism 93. The military, in conducting
an internal investigation, determined that Hassan was not a threat.94
This is indicative of a small but disturbing trend; an increase in threat
diversification from overseas-based attacks to domestically-initiated attacks, plots and
recruitment by terrorist organizations 95. In each of those cases, it does not appear that
intelligence or information sharing conducted or disseminated by DHS contributed in any
significant way to intercepting or even identifying these incidents, despite their domestic
orientation.
What the Department of Homeland Security has, in fact, done is to substitute an
entire information sharing network (fusion centers) because it lacks intelligencegathering authority, despite having an inability to quantify the impact of the fusion
centers or even be able to determine how much they cost.96
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Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical Infrastructure is defined as ―systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.97‖. As an executive
mandate, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which
directed the Secretary of DHS to coordinate the national effort to protect Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) from terrorist attacks98.
The QHSR lumps three disparate elements into the mission goal concerning
critical infrastructure, all under the mantra of protection: critical infrastructure/key
resources, leadership and events.99 For the purpose of this analysis, only the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources will be considered. The United States Secret
Service, inserted whole into the DHS, has long owned the mission of protecting the
President, Vice-President and other key officials and has long held the requisite
authorities to do so.
Over 85 percent of the buildings, plants, pipelines, wiring and land classified as
critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. This includes over 5,800 hospitals,
120,000 miles of railroads, and 2,800 power generating stations across 18 different
sectors.100
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As mentioned in the previous section, the Department established a Directorate
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection pursuant to the direction provided
within the Homeland Security Act. The Act establishes broad responsibilities for the
department in the protection of critical infrastructure, including direction
―To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing
the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United
States, including power production, generation, and distribution
systems, information technology and telecommunications systems
(including satellites), electronic financial and property
record storage and transmission systems, emergency preparedness
communications systems, and the physical and technological
assets that support such systems.‖101

Table/Chart 3 :National Infrastructure Protection Plan Sectors and
Sector Leads

Critical infrastructure
and key resource
sector
Departments of Agriculturea and Food and Drug Administration

Agriculture and Food

Department of Defensec

Defense Industrial
Base

Department of Energy

Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Healthcare and Public
Health

Department of the Interior

National Monuments
and Icons

Department of the Treasury

Banking and Finance

Environmental Protection Agency

Water

Department of Homeland Security
Commercial Facilities
Office of Infrastructure Protection

Critical Manufacturing
Emergency Services
Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste
Dams
Chemical Sectors
Information
Technology
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Office of Cyber Security and Communications

Communications
Sectors
Postal and Shipping

Transportation Security Administration

Transportation Security Administration and U. S. Coast Guard

Transportation
Systems
Government Facilities

Federal Protective Service

Despite the breadth of responsibility, the language provided within the Act
explicitly directs a new DHS to furnish the ―voluntary‖ submission of critical
infrastructure information and develop the appropriate standards and protocols for
protecting said information. It also indicates that the President may designate authority to
a federal critical infrastructure protection program to enter into ―voluntary agreement(s)
to promote critical infrastructure security.‖102
Under that auspices, the Department developed the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan in 2006, which established a series of seventeen CI/KR sectors (an
eighteenth was later added) to develop an overarching framework for protecting critical
infrastructure.
Through the councils and resources provided by the department, a series of
Seventeen sector-specific plans developed through consortia of lead federal agencies and
a series of private-public coordinating councils to manage efforts in each sector. The only
exceptions are the National Monuments and Icons and the Government Facilities sectors,
where the stakeholders are only public agencies.
The results have been mixed. In 2007, an initial assessment of the sector-specific
plans determined that while most of the plans that were reviewed contained some
recommended elements, such as security goals, methodologies for prioritizing
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infrastructure and developing programs to assess threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, many
did not contain a key element identified for private-public cooperation, namely,
incentives for private companies to implement protective security measures 103. In
response, DHS developed an Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Security
Survey in 2009, which provides an online, voluntary survey to assess vulnerabilities and
protective measures taken by (CI/KR) owner-operators. An eighteenth sector, Critical
Manufacturing, was also added. The Office of Infrastructure Protection, now an office
under a DHS component called the National Protection and Programs Directorate, tracks
the percent of CI/KR owner operators that implement recommended countermeasures.
This recent approach received some praise for its increased use of a common risk
assessment approach.104
In a June 2010 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary for NPPD, the Acting
Director of Protective Security Coordination Division indicated that 234 (49 percent) of
437 sites where the ECIP security survey had been conducted implemented protective
measures during the 180-day period following the conduct of the ECIP survey. The
Acting Director reported that the 234 sites made a total of 497 improvements across the
various categories covered by the ECIP security survey, including information sharing,
security management, security force, physical security, and dependencies while 239 sites
reported no improvements during the period105. Another GAO study found that while the
department could better disseminate information about critical infrastructure protective
measures to its private-sector partners, the voluntary nature of the relationship inherently
makes the department cautious about purporting that countermeasures in its
recommendations are interpreted as standards.106
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The Department has attempted to utilize regulatory authority within one specific
sector: chemical facilities. In 2007, an interim final rule was published effectively
codifying the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards107, which established
protective standards for a range of facilities that housed a list of 322 chemicals that were
either referenced in other regulations, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention 108, or
are considered critical to either a government mission or the national economy.
However, it has taken DHS several years to fund, staff and develop a program to meet
their obligations within the regulations; as a result, not a single facility has completed the
CFATS process as of February 2011.109

Cybersecurity
The threat of physical terrorism has been with the United States for some time, but the
emerging threat of terrorist or other malicious acts perpetrated through cyberspace also
poses a daunting, emerging threat. An inability to prepare for and properly defend against
cyber attacks is viewed as one of the ―most serious economic and national security
challenges we face as a nation‖110. While cybersecurity is clearly a more nascent mission
area than others within the DHS mission set, the initial actions underscore a lack of
sufficient and comprehensive enough authority to properly secure cyberspace.
As part of its QHSR, DHS identified Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace as
one of its five core missions111. In addition, two of the sectors identified within the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan are the Information Technology and
Communications sectors. However, the emergence of cyber threats and actual incidents,
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as well as our increasing reliance on cyberspace for a vast array of functions, led DHS to
identify cybersecurity as a unique mission.
Overarching direction for network security of federal agencies was established in
2002 with the passage of the Federal Information Management Security Act (FISMA),
passed as part of the E-Government Act of 2002. Standards for the FISMA are currently
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Cybersecurity
policy was first established in 2003 with the White House‘s National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace. Similar to the three tenets of the National Strategy for Homeland Security,
the strategy identified foci of ―Prevent(ing) cyber attacks against America‘s critical
infrastructures; ―Reduce(ing) national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and ―Minimize(ing)
damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur.‖112 The National Strategy
was later augmented by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23, which called for a
National Cyber Security Initiative 113 (Executive Office of the President, 2008). While no
unclassified version of the directive was originally released under the Bush
administration, elements of the initiative were opened up under the Obama administration
in 2010 (Executive Office of the President, 2010)114. Elements of the NCSI conducted by
the National Security Agency remain classified.
Cybersecurity is problematic in two distinct senses. First, like the broader
spectrum of critical infrastructure (information technology being but one sector), the vast
majority of the hardware, software and support infrastructure that enables the cyber
sphere is owned and operated by the private sector. Second, cybersecurity profoundly
blurs the typical distinctions between the military‘s role and the civilian government‘s
role. The military, through its Cyber Command and the NSA, is equipped with significant
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technological resources and funding to both propagate cyber attacks as a military strategy
and defend against them, while Homeland Security‘s role is strictly defensive in nature.
Both agencies have reached out to the private sector to provide assistance in helping to
secure private sector networks. Although Homeland Security has only recently identified
cyber as a distinct mission; its front-line cyber capabilities are largely embedded as a subelement of its National Protection and Programs Directorate, which also holds
responsibility for the protection of all critical infrastructure, the security of federal
executive branch buildings, the screening of visitors to the United States, and the
National Communications System for first responders115. It has proposed ceding the
function of screening visitors to a different component starting with the passage of a
budget for FY2013116.
The DOD and the DHS did sign a Memorandum of Agreement in the fall of 2010
that established parallel liaisons at each of the agencies‘ respective cyber operations
centers.117. However, these are not agencies that stand on the same footing when it comes
to resources: NSA‘s and the Cyber Command of DOD hold a combined budget of $3.5
billion, while the entire DHS budget related to cybersecurity, including protective
capability, law enforcement capability, research and development and intelligence and
analysis, is less than $1 billion.118 119.
In addition, unlike the prevention of terrorism against a physical asset such as a
building or a ship, where the probability of an actual event is relatively unlikely, attacks
in cyberspace are occurring frequently and with increasing consequences. An estimate
by the Center for a New American Security indicates that the federal government‘s
networks are attacked 1.8 billion times per month120. In the private sector, two significant
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attacks occurred in 2011 that compromised extremely sensitive data belonging to two
organizations. The data was housed at RSA Security, which creates digital
authentication devices for the federal government and Fortune 500 companies, and the
Comodo Group, which creates digital certificates that confirm that a website is
legitimate121 122. Within the federal government, a multi-pronged attack infiltrated
numerous federal agencies in 2009, including DHS, the Department of Defense, the
Federal Aviation Administration and others, causing several of their websites to be shut
down123.
Despite all of the various documents attempting to craft a cyber strategy, there is
little or any distinct authority that emerges. The FISMA establishes standards for federal
network security, which have been developed and refined by the National Institute for
Standards and Technology within the Department of Commerce. Currently, the Office of
Management and Budget, the President‘s arm for managing items such as real property
and improper payments, is the organization responsible for overseeing FISMA. 124
However, there is no defined standard for cybersecurity outside of federal networks that
the DHS, NSA or any other agency can even provide voluntary measures against, never
mind regulations125.
Additionally, the CNCI offers specific efforts as part of the initiative, but does not
specifically identify DHS as having enforcement authority either within federal networks,
state and local networks, or in the private sector. HSPD-23 established the creation of a
National Cyber Security Center at DHS to coordinate and integrate information to secure
information technology networks126. However, the function that the National Cyber
Security Center (NCSC) was tasked with executing was largely already being conducted

34

within NPPD at DHS (The two were merged under the Obama administration) This fact,
plus additional uncertainties and confusion about roles and responsibilities between the
White House and executive agencies, led the first Director of the NCSC to resign
abruptly. 127
The lack of clear lines of authority and coordination within cybersecurity are well
acknowledged. President Obama‘s cyberspace policy identified that ―the federal
government is not organized to address this growing problem effectively now or in the
future.128 It further states that existing authorities at the same time overlap and lack
sufficient decision authority to enact a consistent approach to cybersecurity issues.
President Obama, following one of the policy review‘s recommendations, did assign a
cybersecurity ―czar,‖ or cyber coordinator for the federal government, but this again does
little if anything to clarify the roles of specific organizations within the federal
government. CSIS called the appointment of czars in general ―a symptom of our
industrial-age government organization.129
Pending legislation identifies a number of different initiatives to address these
problems. The act would require companies to report when the private data of their
customers has been compromised, which is viewed as a negative incentive for companies
to increase their protective measures 130. It would also establish DHS as a regulatory
authority over critical infrastructure related to cybersecurity, although the exact nature
and strength of that regulatory role is much in flux131 132.
In the absence of authority to enforce standards on critical infrastructure, DHS has
allocated much of its resource in cybersecurity towards protection of the .gov
environment, when in fact the vast majority of attacks (and the vast majority of the
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economic activity) occurs in the private sector. Over 80 percent of the department‘s
budget in its Fiscal Year 2013 submission to Congress addresses protection of the .gov
domain. A pair of studies conducted by the protection firm McAfee and security
consultant SAIC concluded that cyber attacks have advanced beyond simple identity theft
of individuals and moved to the theft of corporate intellectual property, which has the
potential for even greater economic impact than the $1 trillion in annual economic cost
the first study reported.133

National Preparedness Grants
Since its inception, DHS has allocated nearly $35 billion dollars in grants to states
and municipalities134 although homeland security funding for states and localities has
been allocated by Congress since 1996 through the passage of The Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act)135. Created by

the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Grant Program was originally a
series of seven grants, now consolidated to four – the State Homeland Security Program,
the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Citizen Corps Program, and the Metropolitan
Medical Response System. Under these four funding streams, multiple grant subprograms include fire protection, emergency communications, public transit security and
driver‘s license upgrades136. The Homeland Security Grant program was designed to
provide needed capabilities to states and localities to be prepared for terrorist attacks. In
addition, numerous other grant programs target more specific areas, but fall under the
broader category of national preparedness, as seen in the table below.
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Table/Chart 4. Homeland Security Preparedness
Grant Programs
Homeland Security Grant Program
State Homeland Security Program
Urban Areas Security Initiative
Citizen Corps Program
Metropolitan Medical Response System
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program
Buffer Zone Protection Program
Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program
Emergency Operations Center Grant Program
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program
Port Security Grant Program
Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program
Transit Security Grant Program

The scope of the programs listed here does not include grants that are aligned to
other DHS mission areas, such as Operation Stonegarden, which provides funding for
state and local law enforcement for states on the U.S. border with Mexico and grants for
marine safety administered by the US Coast Guard.
The original formula for allocating Homeland Security grants came in two parts.
According to the Act, each state was to receive a guaranteed minimum award equal to
three-quarters of 1% (the ―three-quarters rule‖) of the total funding, plus a discretionary
amount of the total terrorism preparedness funds137 (Congress of the United States, 2001).
The rest of the funds were allocated on a ―risk-based‖ formula that only took into account
population as a meaningful variable. As a result, states such as Wyoming received $38
per person while the state of California, with a denser population, a land border, a
maritime border and more critical infrastructure, received only $5 per capita. 138
(Matthews, Schneider, 2010).
Immediately, charges of political influence were raised, critics citing that rural,
low population states obtained a much greater share of funding per capita than they
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deserved (Randsell, 2004). In response, the Department developed a smaller program, the
Urban Area Security Initiative, which allocated funds based upon a risk-based formula
that includes threat, vulnerability and consequence.139 However, funding for other grant
programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program maintained population
density as part of its overall framework, although it incorporated elements such as critical
infrastructure140.
Over $5 billion has been provided to cities since UASI began. A study shows that a
positive correlation existed between risk factors and the allocation of monies via UASI 141

Table/Chart 5. FY2002-FY2009 Appropriations for Homeland Security
Assistance
Programs
Amounts in millions
Program

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

SHSGP
UASI
LETPP
CIPP
PSP
TSP
BSP
TRSP
EOC
BZPP
FIRE
EMPG
CCP
MMRS
TTAE&E
CEDAP
PSIC
REAI ID
RCPG
TOTALS

316
3

1,870
800

1,700
725
500

1,100
885
400

550
765
400

525
770
375

950
820

950
838

950
887

198

200
170

125

150
150
10
5

175
150
10
5

210
175
12
12

715
180
15
15
341

50
662
200
15
15
298
50

550
550
12
8
35
50
985
315
15
15
429
8
50
50
35
4,921

300
300
12

50
655
185
20
20
296
50

400
400
12
16
15
50
750
300
15
15
299
25
50
50
35
4,228

10
22
390
168
25
25
333

1,428

750
170
30
30
330

4,370

750
180
40
40
292

4,394

3,981

3,341

3,387

60
50
810
340
13
13
266
50
50
35
4,1
64

Source: Congressional Research Service

However, even though grant monies are allocated based on risk, there is little
ability for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to control how the
money is spent. While FEMA provides grant guidance each year, it does not specify
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items or even provide standards for items that are purchased by state and local partners –
indeed, it does not have the legislative authority to do so. For example, FEMA‘s grant
guidance for fiscal year 2011 indicated that ―Maturation and Enhancement of State and
Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,‖ is one of the department‘s highest priorities. While
states were ―strongly recommended‖ to utilize their funding for this purpose. 142, there is
no way to ensure that funding was used for fusion centers or FEMA‘s other priorities.
Even though DHS‘s authority is limited, the overall regulatory picture proves
more complicated in the area of grants than in the other areas examined thus far. The
original Patriot Act legislation, while providing baseline funding for every state, contains
no provisions or mandates for states to report on its expenditures to DHS or provide
quantifiable updates on progress. However, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006 mandated that every state provide an annual
preparedness report to Congress143. In 2007, as part of its response to the Act, FEMA
released a set of National Preparedness Guidelines that included a process for
establishing current levels of capability and measuring progress towards targeted
capability. Part of the guidelines involved measuring a set of target capabilities
established by FEMA that were standardized across jurisdictions 144 145. These guidelines
were developed in order to assist states and localities with three primary objectives:


to help (states and localities) address deficiencies



to identify alternative sources of capabilities (e.g., from mutual aid or
contracts with the private sector); and



to identify which capabilities should be tested through exercises.
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Using the targeted capabilities list as its starting point, FEMA attempted to
specifically quantify national preparedness through what it called its ―Cost to
Capabilities‖ Initiative, which it designed to help prioritize grant funding based on what
capabilities were lacking on a jurisdictional basis. However, FEMA never was able to
develop specific, quantifiable metrics that could assess national capabilities; it chose to
scrap the cost to capabilities program in 2009 146. Subsequently, FEMA planned on
conducting a nationwide, multi-year gap analysis program, starting in 2009, ―to provide
emergency management agencies at all levels of government with greater situational
awareness of response resources and capabilities,‖(FEMA, 2009). However, FEMA
discontinued this effort in late 2010 due to states‘ inability to provide information about
their own capabilities147.
Arguably, if FEMA has stronger authorities to withhold grant funds, jurisdictions
would be more inclined to effectively report progress. On the other hand, FEMA has not
produced a well thought-out plan to systematically collect, measure and manage against a
set of targeted capabilities; it has rightly been criticized by numerous sources for its
inability to measure achievements made via grant funding148 149. With the introduction of
Presidential Planning Directive 8 in March of 2011, the current set of targeted capabilities
has been scrapped and will be replaced in 2012 150. The implication is that for the time
being, there is no definitive path towards understanding national preparedness; the
current plan, released in August of 2011, plans for a National Preparedness Report to be
produced by March 2012 151. At this time there is no definitive methodology established
for how ―national preparedness‖ will be quantified.
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VI. The Homeland Security Enterprise: Still Disjointed
An examination of particular authorities in the Department of Homeland Security
reveals some potential hurdles to maturation. However, when considering the
Department‘s challenges from a legislative standpoint, it is impossible not to consider
organizational barriers as well, both internal to DHS and outside of DHS. The main
reason internal organizational challenges must be considered is that, among its many
other directions to DHS, the PKEMRA rescinded the Department‘s authority to internally
reorganize, due to what it saw as negatively impactful prior shuffling 152.
Organizational Constructs
When Congress established DHS in 2003, it never intended to consolidate all
homeland security activities under one organizational banner. Indeed, the merger of 22
agencies, despite being the largest government re-organization since the Department of
Defense in 1947, left enormous swaths of personnel, money and functions categorized as
homeland security in other organizations.
In examining the history of the department‘s formation, it was shown that
significant political motivations influenced which organizations were incorporated and
which were left out of the new DHS. By consequence, this left a significant number of
organizations with homeland security functions outside of the DHS. As a method for
examining which agencies may be useful candidates to move into or out of DHS to help
facilitate the department‘s maturation, it is useful to examine where the money for
homeland security is spent in the federal government currently.
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As an analytical tool for determining what organizations may be candidates for
transfer, the Office of Management and Budget‘s (OMB) annual tabulation of resources
dedicated to homeland security functions, published in the President‘s Budget to
Congress, proves a useful tool. For the budget year 2008, a total of $61.2 billion dollars
was appropriated for homeland security activities across 32 federal agencies as diverse as
the Department of Commerce and the Social Security Administration 153. This increased
in FY 2009 to 70.5 billion. and slightly decreased in FY 2010 to 70.2 billion.
In FY 2008, 29.7 billion, or 49 percent, was comprised of the Department of
Homeland Security expenditures in FY 2008. In FY 2009 36 billion, or 51 percent, of the
total homeland security funding was expended within the department. Finally, in FY
2010, 32.8 million, or 47 percent, of the total homeland security expenditures were spent
within DHS. Because a budget was never passed for FY 2011, the funding allocations for
these years remain at FY 2010 levels with minor modifications.
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Table/Chart 6 - DHS spending versus total Homeland Security Spending (in
billions of dollars)

Homeland Security Funding, FY 2008

$31,472.00 ,
51%

$29,755.80 ,
49%

DHS
Non-DHS

Homeland Security Funding, FY 2009

$34,408.80
, 49%

$36,036.50
, 51%

DHS
Non-DHS

Admittedly, analyzing homeland security expenditures is somewhat crude if it
only ascribes to the top-line budget, so a more detailed examination is necessary. OMB‘s
annual document reveals that of the $70 billion is allocated for homeland security
activities, 52.4 percent ($36.8 billion) is contained within 29 other Cabinet-level agencies
and smaller organizations. By comparison, in 2003, the first year DHS operated as a
Cabinet-level agency, OMB estimated that 54 percent, or 23 billion, of the total homeland
security funding was contained within DHS 154. In the intervening years, there is some
slight vacillation due to supplemental funding requests for response to events, but these
data reveal that generally between 50 and 55 percent of all homeland security funding is
contained within DHS.
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The Analytical Perspectives documentation provided by the Office of
Management and Budget presents some limitations in its data. For one, OMB does not
consider funds expended for natural disasters as part of the scope of homeland security,
despite the historical roots of homeland security residing in civil defense155. In addition,
the current set of DHS missions incorporates a mission that provides resilience to
disasters for all hazards, regardless of whether they originate via natural, man-made or
hostile means156.
In order to develop a list where there might be efficiency and effectiveness gained
by the transfer of functions, the principles of scale and political feasibility where applied.
Utilizing scale, a cutoff line of a minimum of $50 million in funds must have been
allocated as homeland security funding. Political feasibility is examined on a case-bycase basis within the context of the recommendations made later in this paper.
In addition, a few operating assumptions were made. First, OMB categorizes
funds that are used to pay for security at federal buildings as part of the protecting critical
infrastructure and key assets, pursuant to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 157.
The NIPP lists federal buildings as one of the 18 key sectors. Because agencies would
likely spend this money regardless of whether OMB and the NIPP categorized it as
critical or not, these funds were excluded from the set taken under consideration, with the
exception of the Defense Department, which retains its own security for military bases
separate from other federal buildings at a cost of $12.3 billion. Also, every federal
agency utilizes funding to pay for its Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs and
activities. Although FEMA is the lead government agency for Continuity of Operations
among executive agencies, each agency must bear some expense for determining its own
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unique plan to address how it maintains critical operations in the event of an emergency.
Therefore, these funds are excluded from the analysis as well.
This renders a set of 42 programs that warrant inspection, listed below in
descending order by their FY 2012 appropriation:

Table/Chart 7: Non-DHS federal funds requested for
homeland security (FY 2012)
Agency
Health and Human
Services
Justice
Health and Human
Services

Appropriation
Dep. Mgmt./ Public Health
and Social Services
Emergency Fund
FBI/ Salaries and
Expenses

State

NIH
Admin. of Foreign
Affairs/Diplomatic and
Consular Programs

Energy

Natl. Nuclear Security
Administration/Weapons

Defense

Justice

RDT&E/Defense
Operation and
Maintenance/ Navy
Operation and
Maintenance/ Army
ATF/Salaries and
Expenses

NSF

Research and Related
Activities

Defense
Defense

Justice
Energy

Justice

FBI/ Salaries and
Expenses
Env. and other Defense
Activities/Defense
Environmental Cleanup
General
Administration/Tactical
Law Enforcement Wireless
Communications
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Alignment
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Domestic
Counterterrorism
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Border and
Transportation Security
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Domestic
Counterterrorism
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

Amount
(in
Millions)
$2,729.10
$2,282.00
$1,794.00
$1,709.70
$1,126.50
$817.70
$728.70
$611.10
$450.50
$355.30
$309.30
$276.50

$230.00

Agriculture
Health and Human
Services
Justice

SSA
Veterans' Affairs
Agriculture
NASA
Energy

Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service
FDA/ Salaries and
Expenses
FBI/ Salaries and
Expenses
Social Security
Administration/Limitation
on Administrative
Expenses
Departmental
Administration, IT Systems
Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service
Cross-Agency Support
Env. and other Defense
Activities/Other Defense
Activities

Border and
Transportation Security
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Intelligence and Warning
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets
Emergency
Preparedness and
Response
Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats

$228.20
$217.50
$198.20

$189.10
$184.50
$183.10
$180.10
$158.20

GSA

Natl. Nuclear Security
Administration/Weapons
Operation and
Maintenance/ Air Force
Real Property
Activities/Federal
Buildings Fund

Agriculture

US Forest Service

Border and
Transportation Security
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

Transportation

FAA/Operations

Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

$133.20

Energy

Natl. Nuclear Security
Administration/Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation

Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats

$103.10

Emergency
Preparedness and
Response

$102.30

Energy
Defense

$155.20
$152.80
$151.00

$135.00

Justice

Veterans' Health
Admin./Medical Support
and Compliance
Legal Activities and US
Marshalls/Salaries and
Expenses, US Marshalls
Service

Defense

Procurement/Other, Navy

Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats

$89.70

Justice

National Security
Division/Salaries and
Expenses

Intelligence and Warning

$87.90

Veterans' Affairs
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Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

$92.60

Emergency
Preparedness and
Response

Defense

Operation and
Maintenance/ Army

Commerce

Bureau of Industry and
Security/operations and
Admin.

Energy

Energy Programs/Science

Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

$86.90

$85.80

$83.00

Defense

Operation and
Maintenance/ Air Force

Health and Human
Services

NIH

Emergency
Preparedness and
Response
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

Health and Human
Services

FDA/ Salaries and
Expenses

Emergency
Preparedness and
Response

$72.00

Justice

DEA/Salaries and
Expenses

Domestic
Counterterrorism

$64.20

State

Admin. of Foreign
Affairs/Diplomatic and
Consular Programs

Intelligence and Warning

$56.50

Health and Human
Services

CDC

Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

$55.70

EPA

Hazardous Substance
Superfund

Emergency
Preparedness and
Response

$54.80

Defense

Procurement/DefenseWide

Defending Against
Catastrophic Threats

$53.80

Justice

Legal Activities and US
Marshalls/Salaries and
Expenses, US Attorneys

EPA

Science and Technology

Domestic
Counterterrorism
Protecting Critical
Infrastructure and Key
Assets

$80.20

$74.20

$52.00

$50.20

In examining each funding stream in depth, we will look to each organization‘s
Congressional Justification to Congress for details about the explicit activities it
conducts, as well as other supportive documents as needed
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Health and Human Services (Public Health and Social Services Emergency
Fund, National Institutes of Health, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, $4.94 billion) – The Public Health and Social Services
Emergency Fund contains a myriad of programs in its role as the lead agency for
Emergency Support Function #8, which involves the public health response for disasters
developed under the National Response Framework158. These include the National
Disaster Medical System, which provides emergency medical services to states and
localities whose resources are overwhelmed, as well as preparedness activities associated
with deploying those assets. Another major program is Project Bioshield, a program that
deploys medical countermeasures in the form of vaccines and medicines should there be
a biological, chemical or radioloigical attack. In addition, the funding includes grants for
hospital preparedness, which provide funding for hospital around the country to develop
evacuation protocols and other emergency procedures. 159
Authorities are somewhat convoluted within the context of health emergency
response. While the PKEMRA established a Chief Medical Officer (CMO) within DHS,
the legislation explicitly stated that the CMO was responsible for coordinating response
and recovery for medical issues natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-made
disasters within DHS, but overall coordination for federal efforts related issues rests with
the Secretary of HHS, pursuant to the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 160.
HHS is certainly in the best position to acquire, test and deploy vaccines and other
medications through Project Bioshield and the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, as well as deploy medical professionals through the NDMS. However, when
it comes to hospital preparedness, many of the emergency preparedness functions
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articulated as objectives within this program are very similar to actions taken by state and
local governments that receive Homeland Security Grants.
In addition, there is a notable omission in what OMB includes within the
Emergency Preparedness and Response arena. HHS requests $643 million in its 2012
budget for a Public Health and Emergency Preparedness grant program it administers to
states and localities161. DHS administers $3.8 billion in grants designed for a variety of
purposes centered around emergency preparedness and security and requests about the
same amount in 2012162.
In terms of the National Institutes of Health, the Homeland Security Act
specifically laid out a research and development program that authorized HHS as the
primary agency to research and develop countermeasures for civilian human health
(biological, biomedical and infectious disease).
DHS performs research and development in a host of other areas via its Science
and Technology Directorate, but is forbidden from conducting research in human
health163. The Food and Drug Administration‘s homeland security funding is principally
geared towards the testing and approval process for these medical countermeasures 164.
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention is the agency responsible for maintaining
and deploying if necessary, medical countermeasures in the case of a medical
emergency165.
Besides the activities listed previously, DHS‘s resources allocated to health issues
are relatively small. The DHS Office of Health Affairs‘ (OHA) budget request for 2012
claims that it serves as the principal medical advisor to DHS leadership, leads DHS
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biodefense, chemical defense, and food, veterinary and agricultural defense, provides
health guidance and policy, coordinates health security activities and improves the health
and safety of the DHS workforce. Yet the budget reveals that over $122 million of a $160
million budget are requested for biodefense programs, while only $2 million is requested
for chemical defense and $6 million for planning and coordination166. No specific money
is requested for food, veterinary and agriculture programs.
The dominant program within DHS‘s health expenditures is BioWatch, a grid of
sensors designed to detect biological threats of high concern. The current concept of
operations involves collecting samples from sensors once a day and sending them to a
laboratory for analysis; if the analysis verifies a known pathogen, then local public health
officials are informed to develop and coordinate a response167. The next version of
Biowatch, known as Generation-3, will incorporate analysis of the sample directly within
the detection unit, reducing the time it takes to make a positive detection of a pathogen 168.
The biosurveillance system is a complex mix of federal agencies, capabilities, and
responsibilities, of which Biowatch only plays a part. Strong concerns about the costs and
benefits of automated detection have been raised by numerous entities, as well as the
need for DHS to better coordinate with state and local public health officials, who will
play the leading role in developing the response to the release of a toxic agent

169 170

.

Both entities also articulated the need for a national strategy for biosurveillance and a
declared coordinating entity for all biosurveillance efforts171 172.

Dept. Of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), General Administration, Drug Enforcement
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Administration (DEA), U.S. Marshalls’ Service, National Security Division, $3.76
billion) – The FBI, as the principal law enforcement investigative agency in the United
States, assumes a primary role in gathering intelligence about terrorists and their potential
activity within the United States. It also administers a series of Joint Terrorism Task
Forces in 104 cities nationwide that provide security for special events, respond to
incidents and gather intelligence 173. The FBI also operates the Terrorism Screening
Center, the principal repository for screening individuals for terrorism activity and
providing that information to appropriate federal and state law enforcement. DHS is often
the recipient of this information, and utilizes it for programs such as Secure Flight that
cross-reference airline passengers against the terrorism watchlist.
The FBI maintains a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate that investigates
the potential hostile use of biological, chemical, and radiological/nuclear weapons, while
DHS provides the defensive posture against these weapons with programs such as
Biowatch, which monitors cities nationwide for biological exposures, and Advanced
Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), which screen cargo for nuclear and radiological material at
entry points to the United States174.
The ATF‘s principal capabilities related to homeland security reside in the
forensic analysis unit it shares with the FBI to investigate bombings, including the
analysis of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from Afghanistan and Iraq (Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 2011). It also operates a National Center for
Explosives Training and Research, which trains federal, state and local law enforcement
and the US military175.
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Law Enforcement Wireless Communications‘ budget request primarily seeks to
consolidate and modernize the four major legacy wireless communications networks of
the FBI, DEA, ATF and the US Marshall Service, and expand the program to other law
enforcement partners, including DHS. The Departments of Justice, Treasury and
Homeland Security signed a joint memorandum in 2004 to develop a joint wireless
system, but modified that agreement in 2008 to ―deploy shared systems where their
respective interests and mission priorities overlap. 176‖.
Courthouse security is conducted by the US Marshall Service177 (ibid). The US
Marshall Service also provides protective details for federal judges and prosecutors, a
function similar to the role the United States Secret Service plays in protecting the
President, Vice-President, and visiting heads of state178.
The entirety of the Department of Justice‘s National Security Division‘s Budget
is categorized under homeland security funding. However, the vast majority of the
National Security Division‘s programs are purely legal in nature, including its programs
that ensure intelligence operations conform to the rule of law 179 and those that represent
federal agencies in court seeking to conduct surveillance or searches under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.180
Finally, the Drug Enforcement Agency‘s primarily responsibility involves
breaking traditional criminal enterprises that traffic drugs, but the agency has also
investigated and successfully interdicted incidences of narco-terrorism. It has also
conducted operations in Afghanistan to assist the military with the elimination of the
poppy industry to prevent Afghanistan from assuming a role as a major heroin importer
to the United States181.
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In examining DHS‘s budget and programs, it provides little capability in
examining explosives. In fact, it explicitly omitted explosives from its strategic goal
dealing with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats in the
QHSR182. However, the department does maintain a large Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC) in many operational techniques of law enforcement.183 One
limited program exists within the Department‘s National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD); an Office of Bombing Prevention, which primarily serves as a ―gobetween‖ among federal partners and state and local governments 184.
NPPD‘s Federal Protective Service operates a program of providing security at
federal executive agency buildings, a function very similar to the role of the U.S.
Marshall‘s Service at courthouses (ibid). NPPD also operates the Office of Emergency
Communications, which is responsible for the National Communications System, which
allows the government to prioritize its communications over differing communication
channels (landline, classified landline, wireless, and radio) in the event of an emergency
and also has developed the National Strategy for Interoperability between Federal, State
and local national security and emergency management officials 185.
Finally, this paper has already paid significant attention to the challenges faced
between the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis‘s authorities and responsibilities
and those of the FBI. To synopsize, the FBI has significant capabilities in intelligence
gathering that the DHS I&A is not allowed to possess per the Homeland Security Act, yet
it must rely on the FBI for this very type of data in order to identify patterns and
communicate information to state and local officials.
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Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration,
Environmental and Other Defense Activities, Energy Programs (Science), $1.9 billion –
The Department of Energy‘s homeland security activities represent a broad cross-section
of activity, spanning a range of operational and research activities. Approximately $155
million is budgeted in FY 2012 for emergency response coordination in the result a
nuclear incident, including a Nuclear Emergency Support Team186 (Department of
Energy, 2011).It also provides technical expertise in the form of a nuclear forensics lab
and technical expertise related to stolen, modified or improvised nuclear devices possibly
intended for hostile use (ibid). While FEMA coordinates all federal agency response
capabilities in the event of a disaster, it relies on specific expertise from a variety of
different agencies, including DOE, within the National Response Framework‘s
Emergency Support Functions187.
Another major element of DOE‘s homeland security budget includes the
protection of various nuclear facilities, including physical security, security systems, and
screening processes ($722 million), which is categorized under the protection of critical
infrastructure and key assets. Although there are some specialized elements to the
protection of facilities that contain nuclear material, many of the core screening processes
are similar to work conducted by the Federal Protective Service at DHS, which provides
the same screening capabilities to over 1,400 federal facilities 188. Thirty-five million is
also requested by DOE for the removal of radiological materials from various sites, while
DOE requests $51 million for the protection of nuclear materials at civilian facilities via
security enhancements189.
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Finally, $125 million is allocated towards protecting critical infrastructure and
key assets in the form of cyber security, specifically as it relates to facilities that house
nuclear materials. As previously discussed in the cybersecurity section of this paper, DHS
may potentially assume authority over cybersecurity as it relates to critical infrastructure
and key resources190 191. Other aspects of the Department of Energy‘s budget allocated as
homeland security funding include a very small portion, percentage-wise, of the cleanup
of nuclear material from various National Laboratory sites ($276 million, or 4.4 percent),
as well as a small amount of DOE‘s scientific research program related to nuclear
isotopes192.
By comparison, most DHS capabilities relating to radiological and nuclear threats
reside within the department‘s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which
largely came into being as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14193. The
DNDO is largely staffed via scientists and engineers from other federal agencies,
including Energy. The Bush administration chartered DNDO and ordered it to develop a
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), which is the framework for how nuclear
material shall be detected when it presents a threat to the United States, both before and
after it reaches U.S borders194 (Executive Office of the President, 2005). DNDO led the
effort to design a series of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs), which were meant to
examine cargo at land and sea ports to detect nuclear material. However, the department
recently cancelled the ASP program, citing repeated issues with operational speed and
effectiveness that had occurred throughout the life of the program195 196. It is not certain
at this point what the replacement will entail.
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DNDO also provides a limited amount of grant funding to assist cities with
developing specific detection architectures, known as Securing The Cities but so far has
only initiated this effort for one location (New York City) since the program began 197.
The department also operates a Radiological Emergency Preparedness program via
FEMA, which helps state and local governments to develop emergency preparedness
plans if a nuclear power plant resides within their jurisdiction 198.

Department of State (Administration of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic and
Consular Programs, $1.765 billion) – OMB‘s budget perspective allocates a total of
$1.76 billion of State‘s $12.7 billion budget to homeland security, of which $1.7 billion is
dedicated towards border and transportation security. 199 The State department‘s primary
function is to screen immigrant and non-immigrant visa requests and the supportive
technology and processes that facilitate screening. 200 Other funds are allocated towards
information sharing conducted between consular posts and US law enforcement,
including DHS. In reviewing these elements, there is little potential conflict in the
functions that the State Department conducts versus the systems and processes that DHS
supports.

Department of Defense (Operations and Maintenance, Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation, $2.59 billion) – The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) detailed
breakout of homeland security dollars is not easily discerned. Unlike other agencies,
DOD does not provide detailed congressional justifications for each of its subprograms or
activities. A small amount of funding is targeted towards anti-terrorism technologies201 .
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This is discerned by separating the amount in the homeland security budget dedicated
towards Research, Development Test and Evaluation identified in DOD‘s appropriation
($817 million). Also included is funding to maintain a constant state of readiness and
execute air patrols at 18 locations throughout the United States, which are executed
predominantly through the Northern Command, or NORTHCOM202.
Although this study categorically excluded funding for federal agency-specific
physical security, it should be noted that the $12 billion previously excluded for internal
security represents another significant and separate physical security program, distinct
from the ones already identified at DHS, DOJ and DOE.

National Science Foundation (Research and Related Activities - $355.3 million)
– While diversified across numerous directorates and homeland security categories, the
largest amount of resources NSF dedicates to homeland security functions is in the area
of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience203. Most of this funding is dedicated
towards applied research, with $40 million allocated towards implementing elements of
the Comprehensive Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI), a cyber-focused strategic plan
authored by the Bush administration204. NSF‘s contributions to CNCI are composed of
three elements: Moving Target Defense, which consists of developing flexible systems
that can thwart potential cyber attacks; Tailored Trustworthy Spaces, which provide
adaptable technologies for developing trusted internet connections that can help prevent
damage propagated by cyber attacks; and Cyber Economic Initiatives, which strive to
enhance network security through the development and adoption of market-based
incentives. NSF‘s infrastructure resilience program primarily funds research with the
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objective of mitigating damage done to buildings are other infrastructure by earthquakes
and other natural disasters205.
Through its Science and Technology Directorate, DHS funds a very similar
program to the NSF Economic Initiatives program mentioned above. It also funds
research for ―studying trustworthy computing in scaled environments.‖ It also identifies a
―Moving Target Defense‖ initiative that will ―move and shift over time to increase and
complexity and cost for attackers‖206.

Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS); US Forest Service, $556 million) – Most of the personnel and screening
technology to actually prevent hostile plants and animals from entering the Unites States
was transferred to US Customs and Border Protection via the Homeland Security Act.
The vast majority of the remaining APHIS budget is dedicated towards research and
operations in order to eliminate hostile species 207.
The US Forest Service‘s contribution to homeland security involve specific law
enforcement operations on forest service lands to counter violations against natural
resources; The Forest Service, does, however, operate an investigative division that
examines the growing and trafficking of illegal drugs on forest service lands 208.
Although the Forest Service does conduct law enforcement operations, they are
primarily geared towards natural resources, an area in which the Forest Service obviously
holds more expertise. However, the investigative capacity of drug growing and
trafficking appears to overlap Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s Homeland
Security Investigations (HIS) division, which holds wide authority for investigating
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illegal immigration, drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons smuggling and other
illegal activity within the United States interior209.

Social Security Administration (Limitation on Administrative Expenses, $189.1
million) – However awkwardly named, the Limitation on Administrative Expenses
appropriation administers the social security and supplemental security income
programs210. An extremely small slice (1.4 percent) of the 12.9 billion allocated for
administering social security assists DHS in administering E-Verify, a nationwide
program that allows employer to determine, through social security and criminal checks,
if a prospective employee is legally authorized to work in the United States. E-Verify
utilizes a Social Security Administration developed and maintained database as one
verification element 211. As the generator of social security numbers for the nation, the
SSA clearly owns this capability and provides an essential verification element for DHS‘s
Citizenship and Immigration Services to provide a tool for US employer to hire legal
labor.

Veterans’ Affairs (Departmental Administration; Medical Support and
Compliance, $286.8 million) – Veterans‘ Affairs resources are allocated towards
information and system security within the departmental administration funding block;
the VA has a $3 billion-plus information technology architecture that includes the vast
VA medical system. Medical Support and Compliance funds provide preparedness
capabilities for Veterans‘ Hospitals in order to help them respond effectively to an
emergency. This program bears similarity to the Health and Human services‘ program
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that assists civilian public and private hospitals prepare for emergencies212 213, which we
have previously mentioned bear similarity to the FEMA programs that deal with allhazards preparedness for a variety of different entities and structures 214
NASA (Cross-Agency Support, $180.1 million) – Information in NASA‘s budget
as it relates to homeland security is extremely limited; however, funding appears to be
allocated towards implementation of information technology security and providing
identification cards that use fingerprints for access to buildings and computer systems,
commensurate with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 215.

General Services Administration (Real Property Activity, Federal Buildings
Fund, $151 million) – GSA owns and maintains a significant number of border
checkpoints on both the Canadian and Mexican borders216 (General Services
Administration, 2011). The Office of Management and Budget has proposed a transfer of
these facilities and their budgets to US Customs and Border Protection starting in fiscal
year 2013 217.

Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration Operations,
$133.2 million) – Federal Aviation Administration operations contribute to homeland
security via the ability to screen and train airline pilots, as well as providing radar and
computer technology to monitor and inform DHS operations about threats or incursions
to United States airspace218 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a). DHS is involved
as partner with the FAA in developing the next generation of air traffic control
technology, which will migrate from a radar-based platform to a satellite-based system219.

60

The FAA clearly operates these capabilities primarily for the purpose of managing US
airspace for commercial and civil aviation, and provides the added benefit of providing
domain awareness to DHS.

Department of Commerce (Bureau of Industry and Security, $85.8 million) –
The primary function of Commerce‘s Bureau of Industry and Security is to control
exports of goods, processes and technologies that may pose a security hazard if obtained
by United States adversaries. There would appear to be some potential opportunity for
comingling with US Customs and Border Protection, which operates a Container Security
Initiative (CSI) program. CSI operates in several foreign ports to inspect cargo bound for
the United States220 221 . In addition, Commerce inspects outgoing cargo for violations of
United States boycotts for political reasons. Although not classified as a homeland
security mission, Customs and Border Protection‘s Office of Field Operations inspects
inbound cargo for intellectual property violations above and beyond inspecting for
threats222.

Environmental Protection Agency (Science and Technology; Hazardous
Materials Superfund, $105 million) - the EPA serves as the agency responsible for the
protection of the nation‘s water supply and wastewater treatment facilities. These
functions represent one of the critical infrastructure sectors under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan223. It also provides capability to help states and localities
prepare for, respond to and recover from chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear
attacks, including large-scale efforts dedicated towards decontamination methods and
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strategies if an attack occurs. While more general, FEMA‘s National Preparedness
Directorate performs many of the same functions for state and local entities, whether the
threat is from an accidental release or hostile use 224.
In addition, EPA‘s budget references that ―testing and evaluation of commercially
available technologies will continue to support those in need of purchasing reliable
equipment to detect and decontaminate CBR contaminants resulting from terrorist attacks
on buildings and outdoor areas‖225. This is also in conflict with DHS Science and
Technology‘s Test and Evaluation group, which is currently developing the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), as well as a Chemical
Security Analysis Center, a BioAgent detection program and several other programs
related to CBRN threats226.

VII. Observations and Recommendations

In examining both key authorities and agency responsibilities related to homeland
security across the government, it is clear that limitations in authority exist that appear to
hinder the operational effectiveness of the department. Intelligence in particular stands
out as an area where specific incidents, such as the case of Abdulmutallab, highlight an
inability for DHS to take information and translate it into action, in part because of the
limitations set by the Homeland Security Act.
Even with the dollar thresholds and categorical eliminations set forth in this
analysis, the capabilities budgeted under the homeland security federal umbrella are
enormously spread out across many agencies. This analysis is not simply, hwever, about
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throwing more organizations and money at DHS; some of the observations about the
allocation of federal capabilities demonstrate a potential for removing some activities
currently residing in DHS. Before recommendations are attempted, however a few key
observations must be established:
Due to the political environment in which the Department was created, it has
been hindered by an inability to hold others accountable for success: In examining
the political history of the department‘s formulation, there was a lack of specific
coordinating authorities granted to the department; subsequently, other agencies, sensing
the coming influx of money that would come with the reaction to 9/11, established their
own programs dedicated to fighting terrorism. The FBI, in particular, reordered its
priorities from traditional criminal investigations to those of terrorism. Also, because of
the tendency to avoid federal regulations espoused by the Bush administration, there were
no specific requirements set upon states and localities, the entities responsible for
implementing many of the protective and preparatory activities that will help prevent an
attack.
Homeland security never was meant to be and never will be a federal
responsibility contained exclusively inside DHS. In almost all of the areas examined,
the efforts of states, localities, the private sector, academia and others are tantamount to
achieving success. The federal government, by nature of the federalist political system
designed in the United States, will never have the absolute ability to execute the
homeland security mission itself, a mixture of prevention protection, mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery. The enormity of the homeland security mission is
too broad for only one agency to handle alone, and the necessary reorganization of the
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government in order to effective channel homeland security into one agency was
predicted to take enormous planning over several years‘ time 227 228 229(Newmann, 1998;
CSIS, 2004; Donley, Pollard, 2002).
DHS rightly emphasized this very point when it created the notion of a
―Homeland Security Enterprise‖ strategy during the inaugural QHSR. DHS defined the
enterprise as ―the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local,
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners.‖ Because of this
principle, any improvement to the Department of Homeland Security‘s effectiveness
must take into account how the department will work with these diverse entities, who will
most often be the first to respond in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
DHS is primarily an operational agency and should coalesce resources
around operational capabilities – Through the capabilities of its major components,
such as the Coast Guard, ICEE and NPPD (although a directorate, it holds many
operational capabilities including federal building security and cyber incident response),
DHS‘s core capabilities lie in the functions of screening people, identity and cargo;
vetting persons and their identity, detection of hostile threats via technology and
processes, and preparing, mitigating, responding to and recovering from incidents when
they do occur. These are the core elements the original Homeland Security strategy laid
out for DHS, and they are still applicable today.
The department does retain capability in other areas such as investigatory
functions, which include ICE, but this is not the department‘s niche. In looking at
opportunities to better define authorities and agency functions that appropriately belong
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in DHS, authorities and agency functions that promulgate success in these functional
areas are ones that will be considered.
Research and Development in homeland security is especially spread out – A
host of agencies contribute large amounts of money to the development of homeland
security technology research and development. An area where this dissemination is
particularly egregious is in the CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosive) domain. No fewer than six agencies (Homeland Security, Defense, the
National Science Foundation, Health and Human Services, Energy and the
Environmental Protection Agency) all spend money on research and development. There
are definite opportunities to rationalize the overall research footprint.
Poor management is also a problem - The Department has not helped its cause
through weak management, ineffective attempts at measurement and a general lack of
risk-based analysis in its decision-making. Although the department‘s own management
failings and difficulties are not within the scope of this paper, they have to be briefly
acknowledged. As mentioned previously, the department‘s transformation from 22
components into a single agency has appeared on the GAO ―High-Risk list‖ ever since
DHS was formed in 2003. The department has been primarily responsible for spectacular
failures in both operations (Hurricane Katrina) and in capabilities development (the
Secure Border Initiative technology program) due to poor leadership, management,
relationships with contractors and other internal factors. The ability of the department to
effectively utilize risk in its decision-making, for example, has been so poor that
Congress dissolved the Department‘s Office of Risk Management and Analysis due to its
lack of effectiveness230 (United States House of Representatives, 2011).
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A risk-based approach to resource allocation is vital not just for operational
reasons, but now, for fiscal ones as well. Like almost all agencies, Congress never
enacted a budget for DHS in Fiscal Year 2011, meaning its funding was essentially
flatlined. The budget passed for DHS in fiscal year 2012 is actually smaller than Fiscal
Year 2011‘s by over $2 billion dollars, not including funding in the case of disasters
(ibid). This restrictive fiscal environment, enforced by the Budget Control Act of 2011 231
(United States House of Representatives, 2011), will likely continue for a number of
years. Risk-based approaches to resource allocation loom more important as resources
grow scarcer.

IV.

Recommendations

DHS was envisioned, much like prior government reorganizations such as the
Department of Transportation, as ―holding companies‖ for amalgamations of preexisting
entities232. But in the case of Transportation, for example, the coordinating function had
an arguably less urgent objective - the efficiency and effectiveness of the intermodal
transportation system, as opposed to protecting the United States from terrorist attacks.
An important distinction between the four agencies that Meier characterizes as responses
to a national priority (HHS, HUD, and the Departments of Energy and Transportation) is
that none of these were formulated as singular responses to a seminal event, and therefore
there was a significantly less compelling desire to quickly organize these departments.
The closest case may be Energy, which was created in part due to the oil crises of the
1970‘s, but these were a pair of lengthy events, as opposed to the immediate upheaval
9/11 created. In other words, these agencies were not organized because of a ―policy
66

disruption.‖
Since DHS was organized by a policy disruption (an incredibly disruptive one, at
that), there was an immediate outcry for the creation of a new bureaucracy, one of the
alternatives identified as typical reactions to a policy window 233. Unfortunately, there was
an incredible amount of political calculation made in its formulation, and as a result the
department‘s formulation, and the formulation of the government for Homeland Security
overall, proved significantly less than optimal.
In its Management Challenges report for 2009, GAO takes note of the
department‘s attempt to integrate its ―non Homeland Security missions‖ 234 into its
strategic plan. If we use Wilson‘s concept of autonomy as a theoretical basis, this is an
incorrect approach. There are opportunities for DHS to request realignment of some
programs that are superfluous to its core mission and request authorities and agencies that
can grant it better autonomy. The problem here is not one of reshuffling the office chairs,
in the sense that the DHS needs to assume the FBI or that FEMA needs to leave the
department The problem to solve is what agency is best organized and resourced to most
effectively perform different homeland security functions?. The White House should reexamine the National Strategy for Homeland Security and determine if the current
configuration of agencies is most appropriately aligned to secure the nation.
Unfortunately, there is a perception among some scholars that the time for reorganization has ended235; however, this stands in contrast to other formulations of
government agencies that were formulated and recalibrated over time, most notably the
Department of Defense. The military apparatus underwent numerous, major structural
realignments before the five fighting forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast
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Guard) were organized under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Combatant Commands
that comprise the Department of Defense‘s structure today.
In order to better rationalize the Department of Homeland Security‘s ability to
carry out its mission, the following measures are recommended. These are not taken
lightly, as they will require significant political will to carry out. It is suggested that these
recommendations could take form under the rubric of a national homeland security
strategy review. A justification of a homeland security review could take two forms,
applied separately or in unison: the elimination of Osama Bin Laden and the need to
better organize the government for efficiency due to budgetary pressures. The killing of
Bin Laden can be considered a strategic opportunity to reassess the various threats to the
homeland. The president can also propose a strategic review as a means of potential cost
savings to the government in these tight fiscal times.
While some of the following recommendations are oriented in reorganizations of
existing entities, others are intended to close legislative gaps that currently expose
vulnerabilities in DHS‘s ability to apply risk-based approach to homeland security across
the nation.
Reestablish the national strategy for homeland security as a follow-on to the
next QHSR; pursuant to it, conduct a full-suite capabilities and requirements review
of all federal government homeland security activity that is led by DHS; allocate
resources to all homeland security activity holders based on this process:
While there are opportunities for reorganization and better codification that will
be examined in proceeding recommendations, the greatest unifying element to improve
the mission of homeland security will be to coordinate budgets across all homeland
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security entities based on a risk-driven strategy. DHS plans a national risk assessment as
part of its second QHSR, slated to begin in January. It should pursue executive authority
to conduct a government-wide review of homeland security capabilities pursuant to its
missions, goals and objectives based on this risk assessment. This would potentially help
the department coordinate an effective response to addressing gaps identified in its risk
assessment and help to ensure that the 48 percent of federal dollars spent outside of DHS
on homeland security are coordinated.
Create a new Import-Export Security division of DHS that would consolidate
the functions of Customs and Border Protection inspection of imports for security
and safety and the regulation of exports for national security and other
considerations by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
– Combining these organizations into one entity would mean administering very similar
functions under one umbrella; there would also be an opportunity for efficiencies if
inspectors can be used for both import and export purposes.
Pass pending cyber legislation that consolidates DHS authorities to monitor
and enforce compliance with federal cybersecurity standards and create standards
for the private sector, especially in the critical infrastructure sectors; also create an
independent a National Cybersecurity Agency (NCA) within DHS that centralizes
protective capabilities and cyber law enforcement – Cyber attacks are, by many
accounts, an underappreciated threat. The Internet security company Symantec, in
response to the increasing volume and sophistication of cyber attacks, identified over 300
million attempted cyber attacks in 2011 236. In the constantly adapting world of cyber
threats, the current federal regulations related to information and technology security are
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considered weak for the federal government and virtually nonexistent for the private
sector, a troubling fact when it one considers that three-quarters of the critical
information infrastructure is owned by private entities 237. While CSIS criticized DHS for
its failure to satisfy it key responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure, it also cited
uncertainty about its own authority as a factor in the department‘s inaction (ibid).
Pending cybersecurity legislation would provide the protocols for information
sharing about cyber threats and attacks between the government and the private sector,
while limiting the amount of liability companies would undertake by releasing the
data238. The one weakness of the bill as currently written is that it provides little
enforcement authority for the Department to compel agencies to comply with standards,
but frankly, this is less of a concern in the cyber arena than in physical terrorism or other
criminal acts because the threat has already been recognized by the private sector.
Generally speaking, companies have been calling for more sharing of information
between the government and the private sector 239.
However, in examining the current structure of capabilities in cybersecurity, DHS
does not possess sufficient organizational resources to counter the rapidly expanding
cyber threat theater. It is not, however, sufficient to grow parallel structures in DHS to
those that already exist. The government has an opportunity to learn the lessons from
previous failures and get the cybersecurity mission of the federal government closer to
right, and it must do so under the guise of increasing restraints upon resources. Therefore,
several significant organizational transfers should occur.
First, the Infraguard program from the FBI, which establishes private-public
partnership programs with state and local governments and the private sector for
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infrastructure protection, should be transferred to DHS. In addition, the government
should also transfer the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the FBI to
DHS. Third, the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, should be transferred to
DHS as well, and this should be combined with the Electronic Crimes Task Forces of the
Secret Service and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s Cyber Crimes Center to
create a national cyber forensics center. The bureau‘s programs focus on financial crimes
and intellectual property; the Secret Service also focuses on financial crimes, while ICE‘s
forensics scope a wide variety of crimes but focus on child pornography and sex
trafficking and tourism. 240
The combined forensic capabilities of these three organizations would represent a
significant combination of forensic staff and technology, while also representing an allsource investigative center for cyber crimes.
Second, the Information Assurance Division of the National Security Agency,
which holds responsibility for protection of national security data and information, should
also be transferred to DHS. This would allow a cleaner delineation between the signals
intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities of NSA (appropriate for a military agency)
and the defensive elements of the Information Security Division (appropriate for a
domestic security agency).
In order to provide this organization sufficient authority, a National Cybersecurity
Agency should be established that brings together all of these activities under a Director
who is a direct report to the Secretary of Homeland Security. This organization would
have three principal divisions - a cyber defense organization, a cyber investigations
division, and a cyber mission support division, which would be responsible for public
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awareness, transformational research and development, international outreach, cyber
policy and other support functions.
Transfer the operation and maintenance of the terrorism watchlist from the
Terrorist Screening Center to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis – In terms
of intelligence, it is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive to create another
intelligence bureaucracy in the United States. The consideration of a domestic
intelligence agency, separate and distinct from the Central Intelligence Agency and the
NSA, has been considered by policy think-tanks and scholars alike.241

242

However, the

ability to absorb of the FBI‘s domestic intelligence capabilities into DHS would be such a
bureaucratic challenge that from a risk-based proposition, it would be unwise to pursue.
In fact, this is not the problem at hand. As the previous examination showed, the current
problem lies less with the government‘s ability to collect intelligence but rather to get the
intelligence quickly into the Hands of front-line operators who can protect actually do
something to protect against a catastrophic attack, as illustrated by the Abdumutallab.
Because DHS owns the responsibility for preventing acts of terrorism in the
United States, it utilizes the terrorism watchlist for a wide variety of purposes: screening
flight manifests on domestic flight through TSA‘s Secure Flight program, advising
international airlines on allowing American-bound passengers to board flights (Customs
and Border Protection‘s Immigration Advisory Program), and screening criminals in the
United States for inclusion on the watchlist (Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s
Secure Communities Program), among others.
Because of these operational capabilities, DHS represents the best location for
information to be quickly integrated into operational protocols. It also owns the
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mechanisms for communicating with state and local law enforcement, which obviously
can deploy resources the quickest if a threat is already within the United States.
Obviously, DHS is not the only recipient of terrorism screening information (the FBI and
the State Dept. uses it for visa requests as well). In the case of State, however, DHS
already is a checkpoint in the visa application process through its Visa Security
program243 (Government Accountability Office, 2010a).
The FBI does communicate with state and local law enforcement, but this responsibility
can be easily assumed by DHS within its existing work.
Examine consolidation government-wide of federal resources dedicated to
the protection of physical infrastructure to an expanded Federal Protective Service
– Federal agencies dedicate enormous resources to physical security; those agencies
identified include DHS, DOD, Energy, the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture and the US Marshalls Service in the Department of Justice. Because this type
of physical security is a DHS core capability, it makes a great deal of sense for these
various programs to be potentially consolidated into the Federal Protective Service inside
of DHS. Many of these security officers are contractors; in fact, within DHS, the vast
majority of the Federal Protective Service‘s security guards are contractors244
In addition, various branches of the military utilize contract security guards
currently to augment security forces deployed overseas 245

246

. There are potential

efficiencies garnered just by consolidating these contracts, as well as establishing core
training and vetting (background checks, etc.) for contract security personnel. Agencies‘
inability to detect criminal histories on the part of security contractors has been cited in
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numerous reports

247 248 249

(GAO, 2010; GAO, 2006, Department of Defense Office of

the Inspector General, 2009). A more unified process could help correct these flaws.
The Department of Homeland Security should have broader statutory
authority to establish risk-based standards for critical infrastructure: Because of the
size of the task and the inherently federalized nature of our government, DHS cannot
control the security operations for the security of every nuclear power plant, bridge and
skyscraper. But what the department can do and do effectively is enforce a unified set of
standards for securing these aspects of our critical infrastructure. Currently, the
department still relies on a fair measure of voluntary compliance from the private sector.
DHS should possess the ability, based on risk analysis, to determine what threats are most
probable (both natural and man-made). It should also be given the authority to enforce
and systematically measure those standards.
The Department‘s Protective Security Advisors program, currently a cadre of civil
servants, would require additional resources to monitor compliance with regulations. As
of December 2010, only 93 staff was responsible for 74 districts within the 50 states and
Puerto Rico.250
The federal government should consolidate its national preparedness grant
programs such as port security, transit security and HHS-based hospital
preparedness into a DHS-led grants program that focuses on critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities to all hazards. The department should lead and conduct a real
national preparedness assessment that takes into account the particular risk factors
of a given locality, then establish capability standards to mitigate those risks. Then,
only allocate grant funds that aim to address gaps or maintain standards.
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Recommendation three has close linkages with recommendation two. As
previously noted, over $40 billion in grant monies have been distributed by DHS or its
predecessor agencies since 2001, much of which has been uniformly allocated to states
and municipalities without accountability. In addition, other agencies such as Health and
Human Services administer grants for hospital preparedness. If risk-based standards can
be established for the 18 critical infrastructure sectors, then preparedness grant monies
should be allocated towards the preparedness of these specific sectors.
Under this framework, grant allocations should be done with a zero-based budget
mindset; in other words, funding is exclusively contingent upon risk, rather than any
formula that guarantees a percentage of funding to states. The assessments should
determine the level of risk, and develop a plan established to mitigate the risk and then
maintain, as necessary, the level of resilience against the risk. While no one is completely
certain of the overall level of preparedness of each of these sectors, a systematic effort
would at least help to ensure that future dollars are spent more wisely. This would also
ensure that there is a sufficient pool of resources associated with the creation of
regulations governing critical infrastructure, so that the private sector is not financially
burdened by these regulations.
While grants themselves would be consolidated and administered under DHS, the
department should empanel interagency review of grant proposals that involve federal
agencies with subject-matter expertise, such as HHS, the Department of the Interior (for
national monuments), the Department of the Treasury (for the banking and financial
sectors) and the DOD (for the defense industrial sector).
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Establish a WMD Directorate within DHS that consolidates the programs
focused on CBRN protections; any programs focused on lower-impact explosives,
such as the NPPD Office of Bombing Prevention, should be eliminated and
capabilities transferred to the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives – Several small programs exist in DHS in the CBRN arena
that all operate with their own management and business processes, as well as others in
the Departments of Energy, Justice and Health and Human Services. These capabilities
focused on the prevention and protection against catastrophic threats should be
consolidated into a single directorate. Specifically, this would bring together from DHS
the following components: the Office of Health Affairs, the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office and the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program from the
National Protection and Programs Directorate. It would also bring together the
Department of Energy‘s Nuclear Incident Support Teams and its security funding for
protecting nuclear power plants, as well as the EPA‘s Decontamination programs.
Because the Department of Justice‘s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate is
primarily investigatory in nature, it shall remain housed there. Other capabilities in
CBRNE that are research-and-development focused shall also be consolidated within
DHS, but within a different organizational structure, defined below.
In addition to the elements that would authority or consolidate organizations into
DHS, there are opportunities for streamlining DHS operations by removing certain
programs.
Remove the BioWatch biological pathogen detection program from DHS and
place it within the Department of Health and Human Services’ Center for Disease
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Control and Prevention – DHS once managed the program (Project BioShield) that
maintained the critical vaccines for dangerous pathogens such as anthrax, but lobbied and
eventually received permission from Congress to turn the operation and maintenance of
the program to the CDC, because it felt that HHS could better manage the vaccine
stockpile. A similar logic follows with biodetection; HHS has better established
relationships with state and local health officials and can utilize those relationships to
make swift, informed decisions to move from a positive detection of a pathogen to the
deployment of a vaccine or other countermeasure.
Consolidate basic research for homeland security functions into the National
Science Foundation, and applied research into DHS Science and Technology Because the National Science Foundation has the scientific breadth of a wide variety of
disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, engineering, computer science, and others, it
represents an ideal location to target homeland security basic research that can lead to
technological breakthroughs. The NSF already breaks out its basic research into a
homeland security category when it submits its budget in order to allow the OMB to
develop its homeland security budgetary exhibit; the NSF could develop a Homeland
Security Center of Excellence for which it solicits proposals. Medical research, because
of statute, would still reside in the National Institutes of Health. The significant resources
and infrastructure of the NIH provide arguably the best environment for this type of
research. In contrast, DHS Science and Technology should focus on applied research that
gathers specific requirements from the operational components of the DHS, with the
exception of cybersecurity, where the practitioners of cyber defense are often those who
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are also best equipped to identify innovation. The newly created National Cybersecurity
Agency would house cyber R&D.
The specific research DOD and DOE conduct in anti-terrorism technologies
would be transferred to DHS, as well as the three programs identified by NSF as targeted
cyber research areas (Moving Target Defense; Tailored Trustworthy Spaces and Cyber
Economic Initiatives). Basic research dollars expended by S&T would be made available
to the NSF for competitive grants.

X. Conclusion

In the challenging economic environment we now face, other national priorities
may loom greater in the political and policy environment we currently occupy than
homeland security, such as job creation and entitlement reform. It may seem like an
inopportune moment to address the problems of homeland security, but very few events
have the ability to impact the political and policy environments the way a terrorist attack
on American soil can. While not all of the recommendations provided herein are geared
towards the prevention of terrorism, many of them are and all of them represent distinct
threats to American security. One only is reminded of the need to tap the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve before Hurricane Katrina‘s landfall to identify the interconnections
between natural disasters and the U.S security environment. The policy window for this
type of effort will prove challenging, but it can be done within the context of a broader
effort towards a more efficient government and a need to review our approach in the
wake of another seminal event (the killing of Bin Laden). On the budgetary side, the
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Obama administration began an initiative last spring to look at an optimization of the
government; only in early 2012 has it requested to reinstate authority to actually
consolidate agencies 251(Landler, Lowrey, 2012). The challenge would be finding the
proper ―policy window‖ in which to structure such a diverse set of changes as proposed;
organizational changes can certainly be entertained as part of a general restructuring of
government if they can be seen as providing cost savings.
Changing governmental authorities is another issue entirely; finding the political
capital to institute a change, such as broader authority over regulations to critical
infrastructure that could result in more governmental power, is daunting at best. Short of
another catastrophic event acting as a catalyst (something no one hopes for),
infrastructure improvements for security could be incentivized as part of a modernization
effort to bring deficient physical infrastructure up to date - the concept of an
―infrastructure bank‖ has been a policy proposal often touted by the Obama
administration and members of Congress as a means of economic stimulus 252 (Plumer,
2011).
Regardless of the tactical considerations that would effectuate such changes, the
need to adjust the DHS should be viewed as a priority. The agency, as currently designed,
requires some additional ―nourishment‖ in the form of authorities and other
organizations‘ capabilities to achieve optimization. In addition, some ―addition by
subtraction‖ can occur if the department sheds some of the functions where its knowledge
and capabilities are limited. If the department is allowed to remain in its current state,
there is a real chance that it will be permanently ensconced in a kind of stymied
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adolescence – mature beyond the initial chaos of its infancy but unable to make the
necessary leaps to adulthood.
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